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Abstract
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The poor state of Cameroon’s infrastructure is a key 
bottleneck to the nation’s economic growth. From 
2000 to 2005, improvements in information and 
communications technology (ICT) boosted Cameroon’s 
growth performance by 1.26 percentage points per capita, 
while deficient power infrastructure held growth back 
by 0.28 points per capita. If Cameroon could improve 
its infrastructure to the level of Africa’s middle-income 
countries, it could raise its per capita economic growth 
rate by about 3.3 percentage points.
   Cameroon has made significant progress in many 
aspects of infrastructure, implementing institutional 
reforms across a broad range of sectors with a view to 
attracting private-sector participation and finance, which 
This paper is a product of the Sustainable Development Unit, the Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World 
Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at vfoster@worldbank.org.  
has generally led to performance improvements. But the 
country still faces a number of important infrastructure 
challenges, including poor road quality, expensive and 
unreliable electricity, and a stagnating and uncompetitive 
ICT sector.
   Cameroon currently spends around $930 million 
per year on infrastructure, with $586 million lost to 
inefficiencies. Removing those inefficiencies would leave 
an infrastructure funding gap of $350 million per year. 
Given Cameroon’s relatively strong economy and natural-
resource base, as well as its success in attracting private 
financing, the country should be able to close that gap 
and meet its infrastructure goals within 13 years. 
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Better access to improved infrastructure services is an important engine for economic growth. The 
poor state of infrastructure is a key bottleneck to growth in African countries, and Cameroon is no 
exception. Between 2000 and 2005, improvements in information and communication technologies 
boosted Cameroon’s growth performance by 1.26 percentage points per capita, while deficient power 
infrastructure held growth back by 0.28 percentage points. If Cameroon could improve its infrastructure 
to the level of the middle-income countries of Africa, the growth effect could be on the order of 3.3 
percentage points. 
Cameroon has made significant progress in many aspects of infrastructure. Across a broad range of 
sectors, the country has made serious efforts to implement institutional reforms with a view to attracting 
private sector investment. Private sector concessions have been awarded for the Port of Douala, the 
CAMRAIL railway, the national power utility (AES Sonel), and the national water utility (CDE). These 
arrangements have generally led to performance improvements and attracted significant volumes of 
finance.  
Looking ahead, the country faces important infrastructure challenges. 
Cameroon is a key transit country for the landlocked countries of Central Africa. However, 
significant deficiencies in logistics performance prevent Cameroon from playing this role effectively. 
Transport costs along the main transit corridors to Chad and CAR are among the highest in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and transport times are abnormally long. Inefficiencies are caused by poor performance and long 
dwelling times in the Douala port, excessive numbers of formal and illegal check points, poor road quality 
as well as governance issues in the management of transport services. Railway and port concessions have 
produced some improvement but investment needs in the sector remain huge. In the road sector, massive 
investments on the corridors Douala – Njamena and Douala – Bangui should help improve the current 
situation; however, the sustainability of these investments is not yet guaranteed due to the lack of an 
efficient road maintenance system (despite the creation of Cameroon’s road maintenance fund financed 
by an earmarked fuel levy). Finally, in order to produce the full expected results on transit and logistics 
performance, Cameroon’s massive investments in hard infrastructure will have to be complemented by 
additional reforms on the soft side of trade facilitation (customs reform, transport regulation, Douala 
single window, etc.). 
Power supply remains expensive and unreliable. Cameroon needs to accelerate the development of 
some of its prime hydropower sites, which would greatly improve the domestic power situation and 
potentially allow Cameroon to play its natural role as hydropower exporter to the Central African Power 
Pool. 
Cameroon’s ICT reform remains frozen at an early stage. The telecom incumbent, CAMTEL, remains 
state-owned and receives substantial public subsidy. The mobile sector is relatively uncompetitive, 
operating as a duopoly. Moreover, while Cameroon enjoys access to a submarine cable, CAMTEL’s 




Addressing Cameroon’s infrastructure challenges will require sustained expenditure of $1,480 million 
per year over the next decade. More than two-thirds of the required spending ($1,095 million) is 
associated with capital investments, and the remaining third with operations and maintenance. Almost 
one-third of the total spending needs are related to the power sector, followed by water supply and 
sanitation. The effort that Cameroon would need to make to meet its infrastructure needs is equivalent to 
8.9 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), significantly below the average for Sub-Saharan Africa 
(14.5 percent).  
Cameroon already spends around $930 million per year on infrastructure, equivalent to 5.6 percent of 
its GDP. About half goes toward operation and maintenance spending ($490 million). The transport 
sector receives the highest level of spending ($273 million per year), followed closely by the power sector 
($258 million). About half of Cameroon’s spending is funded by the public sector. The private sector is 
the country’s largest external financier of infrastructure, with private investment almost commensurate 
with public investment and significantly higher than official development assistance received from the 
member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Significantly, 
Cameroon has succeeded in attracting private investment not only into its ICT sector but also into power 
and water.  
Furthermore, some $586 million are being lost to inefficiencies of various kinds. By far the largest 
culprit is the power sector, which hemorrhages $487 million annually through serious underpricing of 
power and massive distributional losses. By adopting suitable policy measures and institutional reforms, 
Cameroon could recapture these resources for infrastructure. 
After taking inefficiencies into account, a substantial funding gap of $350 million per year remains. 
Some $250 million of the overall funding gap relates to water supply and sanitation and spending needed 
to meet the Millennium Development Goals. Greater reliance on less costly forms of improved water and 
sanitation could reduce the funding gap in the sector by about a third.  
Given Cameroon’s relatively strong economy and natural resource base, as well as its good record 
with private finance, the country should be able to meet the infrastructure targets outlined here. Perhaps 
more challenging than raising additional finance, however, will be making the difficult political decisions 
needed to address the sizeable efficiency gap. But the potential rewards are high. Even without increasing 
existing spending, Cameroon could meet its spending targets within 13 years just by capturing 
inefficiencies. 
The continental perspective 
The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) has gathered and analyzed extensive data on 
infrastructure in more than 40 Sub-Saharan countries, including Cameroon. The results have been 
presented in reports covering different areas of infrastructure—ICT, irrigation, power, transport, water 
and sanitation—and different policy areas—including investment needs, fiscal costs, and sector 
performance. 
This report presents the key AICD findings for Cameroon, allowing the country’s infrastructure 




dependent on natural resources, it will be benchmarked against other resource-rich economies in Africa as 
well as against middle-income countries. Detailed comparisons will also be made with immediate 
regional neighbors in Central Africa.  
Several methodological issues should be borne in mind. First, because of the cross-country nature of 
data collection, a time lag is inevitable. The period covered by the AICD runs from 2001 to 2010. Most 
technical data presented are for 2008 (or the most recent year available), while financial data are typically 
averaged over 2001–06 to smooth out the effect of short-term fluctuations. Second, in order to make 
comparisons across countries, indicators were standardized so that analyses were done on a consistent 
basis. This means that some of the indicators presented here may be slightly different from those that are 
routinely reported and discussed at the country level. 
Why infrastructure matters 
Between 2002 and 2009 Cameroon’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew about 3 percent per year. 
This economic performance falls short of the 7 percent mark needed to make a significant impact on 
poverty reduction and below the average growth rate of 6.2 percent for Sub Saharan Africa.  
The overall contribution of telecommunications, electricity, and roads to Cameroon’s per capita 
growth between 2000 and 2005 was 1.05 percentage points, mostly attributed to a faster accumulation of 
infrastructure assets than to improvements in infrastructure quality. As elsewhere, the ICT sector was 
responsible for most of the contribution, adding 1.26 percentage points to the per capita growth rate. The 
power sector held back per capita growth by –0.28 percentage points (figure 1a). The dead weight of 
power on Cameroon’s economy is close to three times the negative effect that power deficiencies 
represented for Africa as a whole during the same period. 
Infrastructure’s contribution to economic growth in Cameroon was higher than in other Central Africa 
countries (figure 1a). But in the larger Sub-Saharan African context, infrastructure development led to 
faster growth per capita in Sudan (1.76 percent), Botswana (1.66 percent), Mauritius (1.67 percent), Benin 
(1.63 percent), and Uganda (1.54 percent).  
Looking ahead, if Cameroon improves its infrastructure to the level of the middle-income countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, growth performance could be enhanced by as much as 3.3 percentage points per 
capita (figure 1b).
1 Most of the potential growth would come from the power sector (1.26 percentage 
points), in particular by increasing its generation capacity and national access rates. ICT would continue 
making an important contribution to economic prospects (1.25 percentage points),provided the expansion 
of mobile and internet markets continues. Improving the condition of road corridors would facilitate and 
increase trade with neighbors, boosting economic growth not only in Cameroon but also in landlocked 
countries such as Chad and the Central African Republic. 
 
                                                 
1The countries that are closer to Mauritius will show the smallest infrastructure gap and will, therefore, have the 




Figure 1. Infrastructure contribution to annual per-capit economic growth In CentralAfrican countries 
Percentage points 
a. Infrastructure’s contribution between 2001-05  b. Potential contribution 
   
Source: Calderón 2009. 
 
Poor infrastructure is a handicap for business in Cameroon. Evidence from enterprise surveys 
suggests that infrastructure constraints are responsible for about 42 percent of the productivity gap faced 
by Cameroonian firms, the remainder being due to poor governance, red tape, and financing constraints 
(figure 2a). Firms’ perception of infrastructure as a bottleneck to growth in Cameroon is typical of 
countries in francophone Africa. Customs clearance is the infrastructure constraint that weighs most 
heavily on the country’s firms, with power deficiencies in second place (figure 2b).  
Figure 2. Infrastructure deficits constrain firms’ productivity 
a. Degree to which infrastructure is perceived by firms as an 
obstacle to growth (%) 
b. Degree to which infrastructure is perceived by firms as an obstacle 
to growth, by subsector (%) 
   
















































































The state of Cameroon’s infrastructure 
Despite the country’s rich endowment of natural resources, Cameroon’s economic growth has been 
sluggish, and poverty levels remain high. While GDP per capita increased from $680 in 2000 to $1,050 in 
2007, average poverty remained unchanged at 40 percent over the same period and actually increased in 
rural areas—where more than 55 percent of rural households are poor (figure 2b).  
Cameroon produces about 32 million bbl/year of crude oil, yet extractive industries account for only 8 
to 10 percent of Cameroon’s GDP. Significant gas and mineral reserves (bauxite, iron, uranium, platinum, 
gold) remain unexploited (figure 2d). An oil-exporting country, Cameroon felt the impact of the global 
economic crisis and recently obtained a $144 million disbursement under the IMF’s Exogenous Shock 
Facility.  
Cameroon ranks 164 of 181 in the World Bank’s Doing Business Index, and governance issues are 
important deterrents to increased investment. Corruption is ingrained at all levels of society, with 79 
percent of Cameroonians admitting to paying bribes. The country ranks below the 25th percentile on all 
criteria of the Kaufmann-Kraay Governance indicators, significantly lagging its peers, and ranks 141 out 
of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perception Index. Enforcing a contract 
takes 43 steps and 800 days. Improving governance is a priority of the government of Cameroon’s revised 
development policy. 
Cameroon’s 19.5 million people (as of 2009)sparsely populate the country’s 475,440 km² (figure 
3a).Whereas the average density is 35 inhabitants per square kilometer, there are important differences 
among regions. In the south and east, the average density is 5 inhabitants per square kilometer , whereas 
in the west and north population density exceeds 200 inhabitants per square kilometer.  
Following the distribution of economic activity and population, the country’s roads, power, and ICT 
backbones are concentrated in urban areas, in particular around Douala and Yaoundé. About 50 percent of 
Cameroon’s population live in urban areas, which account for the largest share of the country’s economy. 
Urban population growth remains high—more than 4 percent per year versus 2.3 percent in the country as 
a whole, with peaks of 7 percent in Yaoundé and 6.5 percent in Douala. In the past 15 years, urban 
population growth has been absorbed by poor housing spreading out from the edges of towns, with 
growing density in low-income neighborhoods near city centers. Most of the urban sprawl has occurred 
without links to infrastructure and with poor access to basic services. The current urban infrastructure 
stock is almost the same as it was at the end of the 1980s, while the population has more than doubled. 
Nearly 70 percent of the urban population, and all of the poorest urban inhabitants, have no access to 
public utilities or basic services (World Bank 2010b). 
But beyond urban areas, Cameroon has managed to developed natural backbones for roads, rails, 
power, and ICT networks, especially by the standards of Central Africa (figure 4). For instance, there is a 
visible North-South axis, and greater density on coastal areas. However, regional connectivity with 




Figure 3. Cameroon’s is sparsely populated and with high poverty incidence 
a. Population  b. Poverty 
 
 
c. Topography  d. Natural resources 
   
Source: AICD Interactive Infrastructure Atlas for Cameroon downloadable from 




Figure 4. Cameroon’s infrastructure networks follow population density and natural resources 




c. ICT  d. Water resources 
 
   
Source: AICD Interactive Infrastructure Atlas for Cameroon downloadable from 
http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/system/files/gha_new_ALL.pdf   
 
   




The main achievements and challenges in each of the Cameroon’s major infrastructure sectors are 
summarized in table 1. The table highlights the need for upgrading infrastructure in all subsectors, notes 
the obstacles to enhancing the coverage and quality of infrastructure services, mentions ambitious reform 
efforts in this area, and reveals the need to improve the operational and financial performance of state-
owned enterprises such as AES Sonel. The following section discusses these achievements and challenges 
in more detail, by sector.  
Table 1. Achievements and challenges in Cameroon’s infrastructure sectors 
  Achievements   Challenges 
Transport  Relatively high private sector participation  Boosting Logistic Performance Index 
Improving the quality and efficiency of its infrastructure to 
reduce costs of trade for Chad and the CAR 
Roads  Average road network density and rural accessibility to 
all-season roads 
Fuel levy more than maintenance need norm 
Improving the condition of the road network, in particular in 
regional corridors 
Spending maintenance funds more effectively and securing 
finance for road rehabilitation 
Ports  Port sector reform 
Private sector participation 
Relatively good performance of the port of Douala in the 
context of west African coast 
Expanding the capacity of ports 
Railways  Relatively high performance of CAMRAIL  Update rolling stock and rehabilitate tracks 
Air 
transport 
Turnaround of traffic and connectivity 
Competition in market 
Boosting domestic market 
Irrigation  Large potential for small-scale projects  Increasing irrigated area 
Water and 
sanitation 
Reduced reliance on surface water and open defecation 
Improvements in operational performance following 
sector reform 
Furthering sector reform 
Closing gaps in access between urban and rural areas 
Developing sanitation systems 
Power  Relatively high access to electricity 
Reform of the sector, which led to the privatization of 
AES Sonel and increase in connections 
Increase in generation capacity 
Improving financial and operational performance by AES 
Sonel 
Increasing reliability of power supply 
Expanding power trade 
ICT  Rapid expansion of the mobile and fixed-line markets  Furthering reform of the sector 
Expanding Internet market 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on findings of this report. 
Note: ICT = information and communications technology. CAR= Central African Republic 
Transport 
Owing to its strategic location neighboring Nigeria and Gabon, and as a potential crossing point to the 
landlocked countries of Central Africa (Chad and the Central African Republic), Cameroon is a natural 
hub for the region, with the port of Douala as the main entrance. Douala is also the starting point of the 
CAMRAIL railway, which extends 1,100 kilometers toward Chad but stops short of the border. The 
Douala-Bangui and the Douala-Ndjamena corridors are essential to the landlocked countries and provide 
greater trade integration within the subregion of the Economic Community of Central African States 
(CEMAC). However, Cameroon’s transport sector suffers from the absence of a coordinated approach to 




Because of the poor condition of its road network and delays in the port of Douala, Cameroon’s 
ability to move goods and connect manufacturers and consumers with international markets is one of the 
lowest in the world. Feedback on the logistics ―friendliness‖ of countries is reflected in the Logistics 
Performance Index (LPI). The Logistics Performance Index is based on a worldwide survey of global 
freight forwarders and express carriers, who provide feedback on the logistics ―friendliness‖ of the 
countries in which they operate. In 2010, Cameroon’s LPI, at 2.55, ranked 105 out of the 155 countries 
assessed by the LPI. Even so, it was still above the Sub-Saharan Africa average(2.42)and the highest 
among Central African countries (figure 5).  
Zooming in on the components of the 
LPI, in the case of Cameroon the quality of 
trade- and transport-related infrastructure 
(ports, railroads, roads, information 
technology) and the efficiency of clearance 
(speed, simplicity, and predictability of 
formalities) by border control agencies, are 
the dimensions that received the lowest 
scores by operators in the country. 
Transporting goods from port to final 
destination across Central Africa is even 
more costly than in other regions of Sub-
Saharan Africa, which are already costly 
compared to the rest of the developing 
world. Moving freight along intraregional 
corridors in the Central African region
2 costs twice as much as in southern Africa,
3 where distances are 
significantly longer. Moving a metric ton (tonne) of freight from port to hinterland destination costs 
between $230 and $650 along intraregional corridors in Central Africa, compared with $120 to $270 in 
southern Africa (AICD 2010b). In fact, transport costs in Central Africa remain among the highest in Sub-
Saharan Africa at $0.11 to $0.26 per tonne-km, compared with $0.06 to $0.08 in West Africa (Lomé-
Ouagadougou and Cotonou-Niamey) and East Africa (Mombasa-Kigali and Mombasa-Kampala), and 
($0.05 to $0.06 in Southern Africa (Durban-Lusaka and Durban-Ndola) (World Bank 2011c). 
Within Central Africa, there is a huge cost differential in transporting freight between coastal 
countries (such as Cameroon) and landlocked countries such as (Central African Republic and Chad). 
This reflects the fact that final destinations in coastal countries tend to be relatively close to the sea, and 
the costs of crossing an international land border are avoided. For these reasons, freight transport costs to 
and from Cameroon are among the lowest in Central Africa at $1,379 per container, even if they remain 
very high in absolute terms.
4 The average time to export and import is 23 and 26 days, respectively (table 
                                                 
2 Comprising Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. 
3 Comprising Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
4 Cost measures the fees levied on a 20-foot container in U.S. dollars. For more on the methodology behind the 
figure on trading across borders see World Bank 2011c. 
Figure 5. The Logistics Performance Index inCentral African 
countries 
 




























































































2). By comparison, the cost and time of trading to and from the Central African Republic and Chad are 
substantially higher. For instance, it costs $8,150 to import a contained to Chad and $5,554 to the Central 
African Republic. The result is that basic goods are considerably less expensive in the Cameroon than in 
Chad and the Central Africa Republic. 
The high costs and lengthy delays in trading to and from the landlocked countries are due to several 
barriers in the international corridors. Surface transport costs and travel times in the corridor connecting 
Cameroon to Chad and the Central African Republic (Douala-Ndjamena and Douala-Bangui) are among 
the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Expensive surface transport costs along the corridors account for the bulk of the cost of importing to 
the Central African Republic. Inland transport cost in the Douala-Bangui, Douala-Ndjamena, Pointe 
Noire-Brazzaville-Bangui corridors account for up to 65 percent the total cost of importing (figure 6a).  






Time to export 
(days) 







Time to import 
(days) 
Cost to import 
($ per container) 
Burundi  9  47  2,747  10  71  4,285 
Cameroon  11  23  1,379  12  26  1,978 
Central African Republic  9  54  5,491  17  62  5,554 
Chad  6  75  5,902  10  101  8,150 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  8  44  3,505  9  63  3,735 
Congo, Rep.  11  50  3,818  10  62  7,709 
Equatorial Guinea  7  29  1,411  7  48  1,411 
Gabon  7  20  1,945  8  22  1,955 
Rwanda  8  35  3,275  8  34  4,990 
São Tomé and Principe  8  27  690  8  29  577 
Central Africa  8  40  3,016  10  52  4,034 
Sub-Saharan Africa  8  32  1,962  9  38  2,492 
Source: World Bank 2011a. 
Note: Documents required to export (import): The number of documents required per shipment to export (import) goods. Taken into 
account are documents required for clearance by government ministries, customs authorities, port and container terminal authorities, 
health and technical control agencies, and banks. 
Time to export (import): The time necessary to comply with all procedures required to export (import) goods. If a procedure can be 
accelerated for an additional cost, the fastest legal procedure is chosen. 
Cost to export (import): The cost associated with all procedures required to export (import) goods. Includes the costs for documents, 
administrative fees for customs clearance and technical control, customs broker fees, terminal-handling charges, and inland transport. 
 
Surface transport costs are highly influenced by the strong presence of freight bureaus and transport 
associations that prevent truck operators from contracting directly with customers and result in high profit 
margins for the trucking industry. The regulatory framework—based on market sharing, centralized 
allocation of freight, and limits on vehicle mileage (around 2,000 kilometers per month versus 12,000 in 
the developed world)—weakens incentives to invest in service quality upgrades. As a result, the truck 




maximum revenue from their restricted usage. This is a serious problem in the region, one that results in 
too many vehicles chasing modest overall freight volumes. 
Figure 6. Time and cost of importing through alternative gateways involving Cameroon 
a. Cost  b. Time 
   
Source: Teravaninthorn and Raballand 2009. 
Note: The Pointe Noire-Brazzaville-Bangui corridor is included in the analysis because it runs through Cameroon. 
 
Lengthy travel times in the Douala-Bangui and Douala-Ndjamena corridors are mainly associated 
with delays in the port of Douala, which is operating at the limit of its capacity. In 2010, transporting an 
18-tonne, 40-foot container between Douala and N’Djamena took between four weeks and two months 
(World Bank 2011c). Port procedures are responsible for half of the time required to import to the Central 
African Republic and Chad. Productivity measures in the port of Douala are at the level of other regional 
ports, but behind the Sub-Saharan average (see section on ports). Time-consuming regulatory processes 
related to customs clearance and technical controls account for about one-third of the total time required 
for clearance (figure 5b). New port investments are on going on Kribi and Limbé but a comprehensive 
logistics strategy is still missing to address the growing demand for transport services (which may further 
accelerate in the mid-term if some major mining projects materialize). 
Other nonphysical barriers and logistical inefficiencies play a major role in travel times. 2009 surveys 
of corridor operations reported between 70 and 150 checkpoints (legal and illegal) between Douala and 
N’Djamena and 45 between Douala and Bangui (World Bank 2011c). On a return trip between Douala 
and N’Djamena, transporters pay on average the equivalent of $580 in legal charges and illegal bribes. 
Another major obstacle to trade facilitation in the CEMAC region is institutional weakness at the regional 
level and to some extent at national level (World Bank 2011c). 
Due to the physical and non-physical barriers, trade in the subregion is the lowest in Sub-Saharan 
Africa—but it is slowly increasing. With interregional trade accounting for just 0.5 to 1 percent of the 
total trade of its member states, the CEMAC subregion is the least integrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, far 
behind the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA, 5 percent), the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC, 10 percent), the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS, 10 percent), and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA, 15 




















































African Republic increased by about 10 percent from 1.31 to 1.43 million tonnes. The bulk of trade flows 
are from Cameroon to Chad (452,000 tonnes, of which 76,000 tonnes for gasoline and 64,000 for 
containers) and from the Central African Republic to Cameroon (252,000 tonnes, of which 237,000 
tonnes of wood). Flows from Cameroon to the Central African Republic amount to 126,000 tonnes (of 
which 21,000 tonnes for gasoline and 20,000 for containers) while flows from Chad to Cameroon (57,000 
tonnes), mostly involve cotton exports (49,000 tonnes) (World Bank 2011c). 
Roads 
Achievements 
Cameroon’s road density is greater than that of peers. The density of the country’s total road network 
is 72 kilometers per 1,000 km2, higher than the average for Africa’s resource-rich countries at 59 
kilometers per 1000 km2. But Cameroon’s road density is still behind the level of the continent’s middle-
income countries, which have an average of 318 kilometers per 1,000 km2 (table 3). 
Twenty-seven percent of Cameroon’s rural inhabitants have access to all-season roads, as measured 
using geographic information system (GIS) tools, slightly above the average GIS rural accessibility in 
resource-rich countries. But evidence from household surveys suggests that 51 percent of the rural 
population lives within 2 kilometers of an all-season road (table 3).  
Table 3. Cameroon’s road indicators benchmarked 








Road network density [a]  km/1000 km2 of land area  59  72  318 
Classified road network density  km/1000 km2 of land area  38  51  278 
GIS rural accessibility   % of rural pop within 2 km from all-season road  26  27  31 
Household survey rural accessibility  % of rural pop within 2 km from all-season road  36  51  63 
Classified paved road network condition [b]  % in good or fair condition  68  52  82 
Classified unpaved road network condition   % in good or fair condition   61  65  58 
Classified paved road traffic  Average annual daily traffic  1,402  1,099  2,558 
Classified unpaved road traffic   Average annual daily traffic  25  60  75 
Primary network overengineering  % of primary network paved with 300 AADT or less  20  16  18 
Primary network underengineering  % of primary network unpaved with 300 AADT or more  9  36  20 
Source: AICD 2010b. 
Note: a. Total network includes the primary, secondary, and tertiary networks. 
b. Classified roads are the roads that have been included in the roads legislation as public roads. 
 
The existing fuel levy is set at an adequate level to cover road maintenance needs in Cameroon. At 9 
cents per liter, Cameroon’s fuel levy is relatively high compared with other Sub-Saharan African peers 
(figure 7).  




Figure 7. Optimal and existing fuel levy in selected countriesof Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: Gwilliam and others 2008. 
 
Compared to other African peers, Cameroon does not appear to be underspending on road 
maintenance. This analysis is based on the assumption that road maintenance services can be purchased at 
an efficient standardized unit cost. To the extent that the unit costs of road maintenance in Cameroon are 
above this benchmark level, maintenance effort could remain inadequate despite the apparent adequacy of 
spending levels. Current levels of capital spending in Cameroon fall well below what is needed to clear 
rehabilitation backlogs within a reasonable five-year period (figure 8).
5 
   
                                                 
5 Using the RONET model, it is possible to produce detailed estimates of the rehabilitation requirements for each 
country’s road network taking into account the current distribution of network condition and working toward a 
target of clearing the current rehabilitation backlog within a five-year period. On that basis, the rehabilitation 
requirements can be compared with the current levels of capital expenditure to determine whether these are high 
enough to eliminate the rehabilitation backlog within a reasonable period of time. The calculation is helpful in 
illustrating whether current levels of capital expenditure would be high enough to address the rehabilitation problem 






























Figure 8. Countries’ spending on rehabilitation and maintenance, relative to norms 
 
Source: Gwilliam and others 2008. 
Challenges 
In spite of adequate levels of road financing, maintenance activities are poorly planned and 
ineffective in optimizing the life cycle of road assets. A recent audit of the maintenance contracts 
financed by the country’s road maintenance fund found that only about 45 percent of civil works scored 
good or fair in technical quality (World Bank 2011c). 
These deficiencies in maintenance have left Cameroon’s road network in relatively poor condition. 
The condition of the country’s classified paved road network is below the level of peer countries, with 
only 52 percent of the classified paved network in good or fair condition versus 68 percent in Africa’s 
resource-rich countries and 82 percent in middle-income countries (table 3). The quality of the roads 
hobbles the private sector. About one in three firms in Cameroon identified roads as a major constraint for 
doing business, slightly above the average for similar resource-rich countries (at 30 percent), but almost 
twice the level in middle-income countries (at 18 percent). 
The quality of Cameroon’s sections of critical regional corridors is also poor, especially when 
compared with sections in neighboring countries. That weakness prevents landlocked countries from 
moving goods and people efficiently. Cameroon has sections in four regional corridors: Douala-Bangui, 
Douala-Ndjamena, Pointe Noire-Brazzaville-Bangui, and Nouakchott-Ndjamena. The Cameroon sections 
of the Douala-Bangui, Pointe Noire-Brazzaville-Bangui, and Douala-Ndjamena corridors are still not 
completely paved. Although some sections of the Douala-Bangui corridor are being upgraded as part of 
the CEMAC Transport Transit program, about 250 kilometers in Cameroon (and 210 kilometers in the 
Central African Republic) are surface pavement treated. All of Cameroon’s section in the Pointe Noire-















































































































































































Only 67 percent of the Douala-Ndjamena corridor is paved. This means that neither the Central African 
Republic nor Chad can rely on these corridors as all-weather connections to the sea (table 4). 
Furthermore, only 48 percent of the Douala-Bangui corridor, 21 percent of the Pointe Noire-
Brazzaville-Bangui corridor, and 52 percent of the Douala-Ndjamena corridor are in good condition. In 
each of these cases the problem seems to lie in the neglect of road quality by Cameroon. Only 30 percent 
of the Cameroonian section in the Douala-Bangui corridor is in good condition, against 100 percent of the 
Central African section. A World Bank project currently underway aims to substantially improve the 
quality and efficiency of this corridor; most recent data suggest that as of 2011 60 percent of the corridor 
was in good condition. 
Similarly, only 56 percent of Cameroon’s section of the Pointe Noire-Brazzaville-Bangui corridor is 
in good condition (and none of the Republic of Congo’s section is in good condition), whereas 100 
percent of the section in the Central African Republic is in good condition. All of the Douala to Ndjamena 
corridor is located in Cameroon (table 4). Clearly, the incentives for Cameroon and other coastal 
countries to maintain hinterland road corridors are not very strong. Coastal countries’ economies are 
typically concentrated along the coast, making the up-country segments regional public goods. 
Table 4. Condition and type of road corridors passing through Cameroon  
Corridor 
Type (%)  Condition (%)  Average annual daily traffic (%) 
Paved  Unpaved  Good  Fair  Poor  <300  300-1000  >1000 
Douala to Bangui  69  31  48  25  25  65  20  15 
Cameroon  52  48  30  36  35  53  24  23 
Central African Republic [a]  100  0  100  0  0  86  14  0 
Pointe Noire to Brazzaville to 
Bangui  40  54  21  21  49  27  11  0 
Cameroon  0  100  56  39  0  70  24  0 
Central African Republic [a]  99  1  100  0  0  79  19  0 
Republic of Congo  28  63  0  21  69  0  6  0 
Douala to Ndjamena [b]  67  33  52  48  26  49  25 
Cameroon  67  33  52  48  26  49  25 
Nouakchott to Ndjamena  97  3  46  43  10  10  46  43 
Mauritania  100  0  22  79  26  0  22  79 
Senegal  29  71  100  0  63  0  100  0 
Mali  94  6  76  16  0  6  76  16 
Burkina Faso  100  0  38  56  0  6  38  56 
Niger  99  1  47  49  29  4  47  49 
Nigeria  100  0  0  100  -  0  0  100 
Cameroon  100  0  57  13  30  31  57  13 
Source: AICD calculations; AICD 2010a; AICD 2010b; World Bank 2011c. 
Note: The summation of the good, fair, and poor condition not necessarily add up to 100 since there might be some links the condition of which 
is unknown. The summation of the paved and unpaved type does not necessarily total 100 as the type of some links may be unknown.  
a. Asphalt and surface treatment pavements are considered paved roads. 
b. The condition of the Douala to Ndjamena corridor is from World Bank (2011c). 




The relatively poor condition of the corridors in the coastal countries calls for further regional 
coordination and collaboration. The adoption of the Trade and Transport Facilitation Program by the 
CEMAC member states goes in this direction. The program comprises the implementation of a regional 
institutional framework; harmonization of national regulations; interconnectivity of customs information 
technology systems within the region; and implementation of a pilot trade and transport facilitation 
project on the Bangui-Douala (about 1,450 kilometers) and Douala-Ndjamena (about 1,850 kilometers) 
corridors. Traffic levels in Cameroon are low compared with those of peers, making it difficult to justify 
heavy road engineering in the paved network. Traffic over the paved network is only 1,099 vehicles per 
day—against 1,402 vehicles in the continents resource-rich countries and 2,558 in middle-income 
countries. Traffic over the unpaved network is 60 vehicles per day, higher than 25 vehicles in resource-
rich countries, below 75 vehicles in the middle-income countries, but still low in absolute terms. With 16 
percent of the paved primary network having an average annual daily traffic of fewer than 300 vehicles, 
Cameroon’s road network shows some evidence of overengineering—by close to 18 percent compared 
with countries with comparable resources (see table 3). 
In particular, most of the traffic in the Bangui-Douala and Pointe Noire-Brazzaville-Bangui corridors 
is concentrated in the fewer-than-300-vehicles-per-day band. Around 53 percent of the Cameroon section 
of the Douala-Bangui corridor carries fewer than 300 vehicles per day, the estimated minimum economic 
threshold for paving. In the case of the Pointe Noire-Brazzaville-Bangui corridor, about 70 percent of 
Cameroon’s section carries fewer than 300 vehicles per day. It may be that traffic volumes have been 
artificially depressed by recent conflicts. 
The level of traffic over Cameroon’s unpaved network justifies the paving of some of its roads. 
Around 36 percent of the unpaved network in Cameroon carries more than 300 vehicles per day, the 
estimated minimum economic threshold for paving. Indeed, traffic over the unpaved network in 
Cameroon, at 60 vehicles per day, is more than twice the average for the resource-rich countries and 
relatively close to the level for the middle-income countries (see table 3).  
Increasing road safety in Cameroon is a significant challenge. A recent study revealed that between 
2004 and 2007 the accident rate of 60 deaths per 10,000 vehicles on the Douala–Yaoundé road was 35 
times higher than on a similar road in Europe. While human behavior is responsible for three-quarters of 
the accidents, some infrastructure ―black spots‖ were also identified. Car crashes not only cost lives and 
cause injuries; they also have an economic cost that adds up to the high transport and transit costs along 
the corridor. It has been estimated that the direct and indirect impact of deteriorated safety conditions in 




Cameroon has embarked on a new national ports master plan for the period 2008–33. The plan is seen 
as a step toward the development of the Cameroon ports system, which will encompass existing port 




Cameroon has managed to attract private sector participation into some sections of the ports. APM 
Terminals is a stakeholder in the Douala container terminal, having been selected to manage and operate 
the facility on a concession basis for a period of 15 years beginning in July 2004. The Port Authority of 
Douala is also a stakeholder. The private sector also has a strong presence in the ownership, management, 
and operation of the specialized liquid-bulk export terminals. Despite the strong presence of the private 
sector in container operations in Douala, greater involvement of the private sector could be achieved as 
part of wider institutional reforms. 
Traffic in Cameroon’s ports increased substantially in the period 1996–2005 but remained relatively 
light in comparison with other ports along the western coast of Africa. Container traffic in the port of 
Douala nearly doubled between 1996 and 2005, rising to a volume of 190,700 TEU in the last year (figure 
9a), still short of the capacity of 270,000 TEU. General-cargo traffic also grew substantially in Douala, 
rising from a level of 3.8 million tonnes in 1995 to 5 million in 2006. Dry-bulk traffic in the port, while 
smaller in volume than other cargo types, chalked up the highest rate of growth—from 100,000 tonnes in 
1995 to 500,000 tonnes in 2006. The cargo handled by the port of Douala is comparable to that of the port 
of Cotonou but behind the level of the ports of Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire), Lom￩ (Togo), Tema (Ghana), 
Luanda (Angola), and Apapa (Nigeria) (table 5). Nonetheless, Douala is the most important regional port 
of Central Africa, as it handles transit traffic for Central African Republic and Chad. 
Table 5. Port indicators for selected ports 










































































































































Containers handled (TEU per year)  190,700  500,119  336,308  158,201  7,900  460,000  377,208    420,000 
Crane productivity, container 
(containers per hour)  18.5  18  12        6.5  6.5  13 
Crane productivity, general cargo 
(tonnes per hour)    16  9  15  8  22.5  16  7.5  13.5 
Dwell time, container (days)  12  12  42  12    13  12  18  25 
Turnaround time, truck processing time 
for receipt and delivery of cargo (hours)  12  2.5  6  6    4  14  12  8 
Pre-berth waiting time, general cargo 
(hours)    2.9  36  48  38.4    144  43.2  9.6 
Pre-berth waiting time, bulk dry (hours)  1.5  1    48          6 
Pre-berth waiting time, container 
(hours)  1.6  1  12  24    1  96  38.4  12.4 
Handling charge, bulk dry ($ per tonne)  6  5    5    5  5  2.75  3 
Handling charge, cargo container ($ 
per TEU)  220  260  155  180    220  320  140  168 
Handling charge, general cargo ($ per 
tonne)  6.5  13.5  8  8.5  8  9  8.5  5.5  10 
Source: AICD ports database downloadable from http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data. 
Note: Data are as of 2006. 
—= data not available. 
TEU = 20-foot equivalent units. 




Figure 9. Port demand in Cameroon 
a. Container volumes  b. By commodity grouping 
   
Source: Ocean Shipping Consultants 2009. 
TEU = 20-foot equivalent units. 
 
Compared to other ports on the west coast of Africa, the Port Douala is one of the most efficient, 
particularly in handling containers. But still it lags behind the average port in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Container crane productivity, at 18.5 containers per hour, was the highest among ports along the west 
coast in 2005(matched only by the port of Abidjan, which may have deteriorated since with the return of 
conflict in Côte d’Ivoire), but not even half the Sub-Saharan African average. Container dwell time and 
truck turnaround time, at 12 days each, are the lowest in the region, versus 7 days for an average port in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. After Abidjan, the pre-berth waiting time for containers (1.6 hours) is the lowest 
among ports in this part of Africa. In the other cargo sectors, performance is consistent with the norms for 
the region and, as such, there is room for significant improvement as the performance of the ports in this 
part of the continent trails the average for Sub-Saharan Africa port. Further privatization of the customs 
clearance system and expansion of the port might help improve the performance of the port of Douala. 
Challenges 
Further implementation of Cameroon’s economic reform program—complementing exploitation of 
Cameroon’s natural wealth, including its forestry and mining resources (notably bauxite, iron, cobalt, 
nickel, rutile), natural gas, and hydrocarbon products—will boost growth and increase the demand for 
port facilities. The capacity of the country’s ports is being stretched as demand for services rises, leading 
to longer transit times to Chad and the Central African Republic. Overall the four ports in Cameroon have 
a capacity of close to 7 million tonnes per year; in 2006 they handled in excess of 6 million tonnes of 
cargo annually—with Douala accounting for over 95 percent of this.
6The available capacity remaining in 
the port system is relatively tight, and to a significant extent does not match the requirements of modern 
shipping. The port of Douala is quickly approaching its available capacity, and none of the other public 
ports offers a viable alternative, at least in their current form. It is against this background that the 
formulation of a new national ports master plan that will add modern new port capacity is essential.  
Port and cargo-handling costs in the port of Douala are at the higher end of charges paid along the 
West African coastline, which in turn are higher than elsewhere in Africa. The handling charge is $220 
per TEU for containers and $6.5 per tonne of general cargo (table 5). To some extent, though, this must 
                                                 
6 Douala is the largest port in terms of volume handled; Kribi is a distant second, followed by the much smaller ports 






















































be viewed as a natural outcome of the tight balance between available capacity and demand and the lack 
of broad-based institutional reform, which has perpetuated built-in inefficiencies and structural problems. 
Capacity expansion and wider institutional reforms offer the route to lower port and cargo-handling costs. 
More generally, the charges levied in Central African ports do not compare favorably with the rest of 
Africa; let alone with global best practice. Compared with global best practice, Africa’s ports are 
generally expensive to use and subject to extensive delays. Southern African ports tend to perform 
somewhat better than those in other regions across a range of parameters. The services provided by 
Central and West African ports generally cost twice as much as those in other global ports. Unlike in 
Central Africa, most southern African terminals offer a given number of free days’ storage—typically up 
to seven days—and thereafter apply a daily storage charge, sometimes on a sliding scale that increases as 
the number of days increases. 
Finally, the port of Douala is not yet ISPS-code compliant. In 2006 the port introduced a container-
scanning device. At the beginning of 2007 new automated customs procedures went into effect. However, 
the authorities estimate that it will still take a number of years to exit the ISPS blacklist. 
Rails 
The railways of Cameroon perform relatively well by African standards, with good productivity 
indicators. Cameroon implemented one of the earliest rail concessions in the region—CAMRAIL. The 
concession arrangement has helped to boost operational efficiency and thus traffic, so that labor and 
rolling stock productivity measures show substantially better performance than the region’s major 
publicly owned railways and compare favorably with other rail concessions in the region (table 6). 
CAMRAIL carries about 60 percent of nonmineral traffic from Douala to the borders with the Central 
African Republic and Chad, and it compares favorably with competing bus services on the route from 
Yaoundé to Ngaoundéré, for which travel by unpaved road becomes difficult in the rainy season. 
Table 6. Comparative performance ofCentral African railways, 2005 







productivity  Freight yield  Passenger 
yield 
Angola, CFM  580  4,045  30  950     
Cameroon, CAMRAIL  603  4,738  26  868  5  2 
Congo, Dem. Rep., CFMK  18  64  10  257  14  4 
Congo, Dem. Rep, SNCC  38  275  4  317  13  3 
Congo, Rep., CFCO  221  3,212  27  300  11  6 
Gabon, SETRAG  1,778  1,891  39  902     
Rail concessions  350  2,945  23  491  5  2 
Source: AICD railways database.  
Legend: Labor productivity = ‘000s traffic units per employee; Locomotive productivity = millions of traffic units per locomotive; 
Carriage productivity = ‘000s passenger-kilometers per carriage; Wagon productivity = ‘000s net tonne-kilometers per wagon. 
 
Since 2007 the concessionaire’s productivity has improved. The share of working locomotives 




1.4 in 2007 to 2 in 2010. The ratio of staff costs to traffic revenues dropped from 27.6 percent in 2007 to 
25.7 in 2010. In 2010, CAMRAIL’s sales increased by 5 percent (World Bank 2011c). 
CAMRAIL is one of the more 
intensively used networks in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, at 1.1 million traffic units per 
route-km, compared to others in the 
region, which serve well under one 
million traffic units per year (figure 10). 
Nevertheless, CAMRAIL’s traffic density 
is lower than the average for West Africa, 
and only a fraction of that found in 
southern Africa and North Africa. By 
global standards, these kinds of traffic 
volumes are little more than what might 
be carried by a moderately busy branch 
line. Moreover, such low traffic volumes 
do not generate the revenue needed to 
finance track rehabilitation and upgrading. 
Challenges 
In spite of relatively good performance, CAMRAIL activities are affected by obsolete rolling stock 
and deteriorated infrastructure. Because of these supply constraints, CAMRAIL cannot adequately 
respond to the growing demand for passenger and freight transport. But plans to acquire 38 new 
passenger cars and rehabilitate 175 km of the most-deteriorated track sections of the 1,104 km–long 
railway line between Douala and Ngaoundéré are being implemented (World Bank 2011c). These projects 
will allow CAMRAIL to expand and meet increasing demand.  
More broadly, the Government is working on a long-term master plan for the development on the 
railway sector. The required investments are likely to be high, and until they can be fully funded a logical 
first step will be optimize the operation of the existing concession. If some of the large-scale mining 
projects under consideration were to materialize, further rail development may be warranted to connect 
mining sites with ports. However, this is contingent on a careful analysis of demand. 
Air transport 
Achievements 
Cameroon is a natural air-traffic hub for Central Africa, as demonstrated by relatively high traffic 
levels. With close to a million total seats, Cameroon’s traffic was higher than that of the Central African 
Republic, Gabon, Chad, and Congo, but well below that of Nigeria. After Nigeria, Cameroon had the 
second-highest number of international and intercontinental seats (table 7). 
   
Figure 10. Traffic densities on African railways 
 
Source: AICD 2010b. 
Note: Density is normally expressed as traffic units per route-km. The traffic units 
carried by a railway are the sum of the passenger-km and the net tones-km.  






































Table 7. Benchmarking of Cameroon’s air transport indicators 




Gabon  Chad  Nigeria  Congo, 
Rep. of  
Total  975,865  44,503  769,912  197,682  13,116,015  913,478 
Domestic seats (seats per year)  105,742  N/A  374,400  N/A  9,304,568  443,634 
Seats for international travel within Africa  (seats per year)  472,089  20,661  272,792  109,074  1,373,745  351,882 
Seats for intercontinental travel (seats per year)  398,034  23,842  122,720  88,608  2,437,702  117,962 
Seats available per  capita  0.05  0.01  0.59  0.018  0.089  0.24 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index—air transport market (%)  10  50  39  36  11  31 
Percent of seat km in newer aircraft  92  100  98  100  71  73 
Percent of seat km in medium or smaller aircraft  32  24  28  94  28  51 
Percent of carriers passing IATA/IOSA Audit  0  0  0  0  28.6  0 
FAA/IASA Audit Status (as of February 2011)  No audit  No audit  No audit  No audit  Passed  No audit 
Source: Bofinger 2009. All data as of 2007 based on estimations and computations of scheduled advertised seats, as published by the Diio SRS 
Analyzer. This captures 98 percent of worldwide traffic, but a higher percentage of African traffic is not captured by the data. 
Note: FAA = U.S. Federal Aviation Administration; IASA = International Aviation Safety Assessment; IATA = International Air Transport Association; 
IOSA = IATA International Safety Audit.  
— = Data not available. 
 
After years of decline, Cameroon’s air traffic and connectivity are recovering from the air transport 
market collapse. Between 2001 and 2007 the number of total seats declined from 1,784,023 to 975,865. In 
2009 the total number of seats grew to 1,259,276 seats, an expansion of 30 percent over 2007. In 
particular, the number of international seats grew by about 50 percent between 2007 and 2009, from 
472,089 to 698,360 (figure 11a).  
International connectivity is recovering. Between 2001 and 2007 international city pairs served 
dropped from 25 to 17. Preliminary numbers show that in 2009 city pairs were 20, showing a slightly 
recover in the number of international city pairs (figure 11b).  
Figure 11. Evolution of seats and city pairs in Cameroon 
a. Seats  b. City pairs 
   
Source: Bofinger 2009. Derived from AICD national database downloadable from http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data 




















































Cameroon’s air market is more competitive than that of other countries in the region. The Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index (HHI), a commonly accepted measure of market concentration,
7shows that Cameroon 
has the lowest concentration of services among its neighbors, with the measurement taken before the 
collapse of Cameroon Airlines. The collapse of Cameroon Airlines was followed by a significant increase 
in capacity by Royal Air Maroc and Ethiopian airlines, indicative of a more liberalized environment. 
Cameroon is one of the few African countries that has managed to attract private sector participation 
in its air transport infrastructure. Between 1993 and 2008, 7 of Cameroon’s 14 airports were included in a 
15-year joint-management contract involving shared risk between the public and private sector. The 
contract was co-managed by Aéroports de Paris (34 percent) and the government of Cameroon (24 
percent), and other carriers (42 percent).  
Challenges 
In spite of the general traffic turnaround, the domestic market has yet to recover. The domestic 
market was the most impacted by the collapse of the air market: the number of domestic seats dropped 
from 640,620 in 2001 to 105,742 in 2007, a decline of 80 percent. In 2008 Cameroon's domestic capacity 
nearly collapsed with the demise of Cameroon Airlines. In 2009 the number of domestic seats further 
declined by 66 percent from 2007 levels, dropping to 36,480 seats (figure 11a). Similarly, the number of 
domestic city pairs dropped from 17 in 2001 to 10 in 2007 and 1 in 2009 (figure 11b). 
Safety oversight needs strengthening. In September 2005 Cameroon Airlines was blocked from 
entering France until significant improvements in operations could be demonstrated. The ban was 
eventually lifted. But the 2005 safety audit of the International Civil Aviation Organization showed 
significant room for improvement. As part of a regional West and Central African project, Cameroon is 
now working on improving its safety oversight. 
Water resources 
Cameroon is well endowed with fresh water. In the south, the principal rivers—the Wouri, Sanaga, 
Nyong, and Ntem—flow southwestward or westward directly into the Gulf of Guinea. The Dja and Kadeï 
rivers drain southeastward into the Congo River. In northern Cameroon, the Benoué (Benue) runs north 
and west, eventually into the Niger, and the Logone flows northward into Lake Chad, which Cameroon 
shares with Chad, Nigeria, and Niger. The renewable water resource per capita is estimated at about 
17,520 cubic meters per year, more than twice as much the Sub-Saharan African average of 7,000 cubic 
meters per year. Rainfall averages 1,604 mm per year, but levels vary across regions and over the course 
of the year.  
Several factors exert pressure on water resources. Agricultural production represents 74 percent of 
total water use—with rice, in particular, accounting for heavy demand. Household use represents 18 
percent of total water use and has increased over time, but access to clean water remains a major 
challenge for the population, as inconsistent and poor policies, combined with weak sector governance in 
                                                 
7The index is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the 
resulting numbers. An HHI of 100 indicates the market is a monopoly; the lower the HHI, the more diluted the 




the last two decades, have limited the development the water supply and sanitation sectors (World Bank 
2007). The industrial sector—accounting for 8 percent of the total water use—is growing as the economy 
surges. 
Irrigation 
Irrigation potential in Cameroon is substantial. Only 22,450 hectares out of a physical potential of 
290,000 hectares are presently irrigated (figure 12). 
The irrigated area could be increased substantially with good economic returns. Simulations suggest 
that taking a threshold internal rate of return of 6 percent it is already economically viable to develop 
518,176 hectares of land for irrigation through large- and small-scale projects, with the former 
representing 55 percent of the total. Water for irrigation can be collected in two ways: through large, dam-
based schemes, or through small projects based on collection of run-off from rainfall. The investment 
costs of large-scale irrigation development reflect only irrigation-specific infrastructure, such as 
distribution canals and on-farm system development. The potential for small-scale irrigation is assessed 
not only on the basis of agro-ecological conditions, but also in terms of market access, since irrigation is 
typically viable only if the increased yields can be readily marketed. The unit cost for large scale projects 
is set at $3,000/hectare and for small scale projects at $2,000/hectare. 
Figure 12. Cameroon’s current irrigation area 
 
 




If the threshold internal rate of return were raised to 12 percent, the area economically viable for 
irrigation would shrink to 170,463 hectares, and only small-scale projects would remain viable. Large-
scale projects seem not to be economically viable in Cameroon for a IRR of more than 12 percent. The 
investment required to attain this expansion (with 12 percent IRR) is $881 million, with an acceptable 
IRR of 40 percent (table 8). This area with irrigation potential is concentrated in the central and northern 
parts of the country (figure 13). Regionally, Cameroon is, after Chad, the country with the greatest 
potential for small-scale irrigation projects at a rate of return comparable with regional peers (figure 14). 
Figure 13. Cameroon’s irrigation potential (baseline scenario) 
 
 
Source: Map on current area: AICD Interactive Infrastructure Atlas for Cameroon downloadable from http://www.infrastructureafrica.org. 
Map on irrigation potential: You and others(2009: appendix 2). 
Note: The baseline scenario was calculated assuming investment cost of $3,000 per hectare, a canal maintenance and water-delivery cost of 
$0.01 per cubic meter, on-farm annual operation and maintenance costs of $30 per hectare, and a discount rate of 12 percent. 
 




Table 8. Cameroon's irrigation potential 
Cutoff (%) 
Large-scale  Small-scale  Total 
Investment  IRR  Area increase  Investment  IRR  Area 
increase  Investment  IRR  Area 
increase 
$millions  %  hectares  $millions  %  hectares  $millions  %  hectares 
0  986  5.4  505,124  1538  29.0  297,633  2524  14  802,757 
6  557  6.9  285,461  1203  34.0  232,715  1760  19  518,176 
12  0  0.0  0  881  42.0  170,463  881  42  170,463 
24  0  0.0  0  553  59.0  106,978  553  59  106,978 
Source: You and others 2009. 
Note: Water for irrigation can be collected in two ways: through large, dam-based schemes, or through small projects based on collection of 
run-off from rainfall. The investment costs of large-scale irrigation development reflect only irrigation-specific infrastructure, such as distribution 
canals and on-farm system development. The potential for small-scale irrigation is assessed not only on the basis of agro-ecological conditions, 
but also in terms of market access, since irrigation is typically viable only if the increased yields can be readily marketed. The unit cost for large 
scale projects is set at USD3000/ha and for small scale projects at USD2000/ha. 
 
Figure 14. Small-scale irrigation potential 
 
Source: You and others 2009. 
Note: Based on 12% cutoff estimates, at which the estimated area increase for Central African countries not included in 
the figures is zero. Water for irrigation can be collected in two ways: through large, dam-based schemes, or through small 
projects based on collection of run-off from rainfall. The investment costs of large-scale irrigation development reflect only 
irrigation-specific infrastructure, such as distribution canals and on-farm system development. The potential for small-
scale irrigation is assessed not only on the basis of agro-ecological conditions, but also in terms of market access, since 
irrigation is typically viable only if the increased yields can be readily marketed. 
Water supply and sanitation 
Achievements 
Cameroon has reduced its reliance on surface water due to the rapid expansion of wells and 
boreholes. Reliance on surface water dropped from 37 percent of the population in 1991 to 32 percent in 
1998 and to 9 percent in 2006 (table 9). Between 1998 and 2006 about 2.2 percent of the population 
shifted from using surface water to some other form of supply (figure 15a). In rural areas, 3.8 percent of 
the population moved up the water supply ladder from surface water, in particular by gaining access to 










































































between 1998 and 2006, a level comparable with the average in resource-rich countries. However, high 
and increasing reliance on wells and boreholes does not always guarantee safe water quality, as many 
wells and boreholes are unprotected and, hence, do not provide safe water.  









    2005  1991  1998  2006  2005 
Access to piped water  % pop  13  13  17  20  61 
Access to stand posts  % pop  12  24  31  23  22 
Access to wells/boreholes  % pop  47  27  23  47  5 
Access to surface water  % pop  27  37  32  9  11 
Access to septic tanks  % pop  13  6  9  12  48 
Access to improved latrines  % pop  37  53  48  46  34 
Access to traditional latrines  % pop  22  27  33  35  7 
Open defecation  % pop  28  14  9  7  11 
        2005     
Domestic water consumption  liter/capita/day  115    —    196 
Revenue collection  % sales  60    —    99 
Distribution losses  % production  40    37    29 
Cost recovery  % total costs  67    56    86 
Operating cost recovery  % operating costs  94    79    121 
Labor productivity  connections per employee  96    —    203 







Average effective tariff  US$ per m3  0.8  0.6  0.03–0.6 
Source: AICD water supply and sanitation database, downloadable from http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data. 
Note: Access figures from Demographic and Health Surveys (1991 and 1998) and Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey (2006) as reported by 
WHO 2010a and 2010b. A country is considered to have non-scarce water resources if renewable internal freshwater resources per capita are 
greater than 3,000 mm. 
— = data not available. 
 
Open defecation has also declined, if slowly, with the expansion of traditional latrines (figure 15b). 
The practice declined from 9 percent to 7 percent between 1998 and 2006, both figures being only about a 
quarter of the typical level of open defecation in resource-rich countries (table 9). Over this period, use of 
traditional latrines increased from 33 percent of the population in 1998 to 35 percent in 2006. But because 
the overall level of access to improved sanitation in 2006 remained just 47 percent, the country was far 
behind the goal of achieving the Millennium Development Goal of 74 percent of population with access 
to improved sanitation (AMCOW 2010b). 




Figure 15. Annual gain in access each year to various modes of water supply and sanitation, 1998–2006 
a. Water  b. Sanitation 
   
Source: WHO 2010a and 2010b, from the 1998 Demographic and Health Survey and 2006 Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey. 
 
Cameroon has made significant institutional reforms affecting urban water supply. By the end of the 
1990s the operational and financial performance of the national urban water utility, SNEC,
8 had become 
problematic (World Bank 2007a). Facing unreliable services, commercial and industrial users started to 
develop their own alternatives. In October 2005, the government created a public holding company 
(CAMWATER
9) to plan sector development and investments (such as construction, rehabilitation, and 
management of potable water infrastructures). In addition, the government signed a 10-year affermage 
contract with CDE
10 commencing in May 2008 for the production, transport, and distribution of water in 
106 urban and peri-urban centers (figure 16). 
   
                                                 
8 Société Nationale des Eaux du Cameroun. 
9 Cameroon Water Utilities Corporation. 
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Figure 16. Actors in the water supply sector in Cameroon 
 
Source: CDE 2011. 
 
In CDE’s first years of operation 
significant efficiency improvements 
were achieved by reining in hidden 
costs (defined in box 1). Between 
2008 and 2010 non-revenue water 
drop from 41 to 34 percent of the 
production and collection ratio 
increased from 59 to 66 percent of the 
billings, with the cost recovery ratio 
increased from 1 to 1.2. These 
improvements reduced hidden costs 
from 121 to 81 percent of revenues 
between 2008 and 2010, below the 
level of other countries in the region (figure 17). 
   
Box 1. Hidden costs in utilities 
A monetary value can be attributed to observable operational 
inefficiencies—mispricing, unaccounted-for losses, and 
undercollection of bills, to mention three of the most conspicuous—by 
using the opportunity costs of operational inefficiencies, that is, tariffs 
for uncollected bills and production costs for mispricing and 
unaccounted-for losses. These costs are considered hidden since they 
are not explicitly captured by the financial flows of the operator. 
Hidden costs are calculated by comparing a specific inefficiency 
against the value of that operational parameter in a well-functioning 
utility (or the respective engineering norm), and multiplying the 
difference by the opportunity costs of the operational inefficiency. 




Figure 17. Hidden costs of water supply utilities in Cameroon and Central Africa countries 
a. CDE  b. Selected water utilities in Central Africa 
   
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia and others 2009. 
DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo; CAR = Central African Republic. 
Challenges 
The institutional setup for the provision of water supply and sanitation services in Cameroon needs to 
be completed and clarified. Cameroon has made efforts to decentralize the provision of services but so far 
has failed to implement the policy. The inability of local authorities to manage water and sanitation 
services as stated in the laws on decentralization is noticeable (Global Water Partnership 2010). The 
sanitation sector is very poorly organized, lacking goals, a specific strategy, and a dedicated institutional 
body (AMCOW 2010b). 
There is a wide disparity between rural and urban populations in access to sources of drinking water. 
At 69 percent of the population, urban access to household piped water and public stand posts is 6 times 
higher than rural access; at 28 percent, urban reliance on wells and boreholes is one-third of the level in 
rural areas (figure 18a). As of 2006, 72 percent of the rural population got their water from boreholes 
equipped with hand pumps, compared with 34 percent on 1998. 
Sewerage is virtually nonexistent in Cameroon, and no major investment has been made in recent 
years. A tiny 5 km sewerage network in Douala dates from before independence and is no longer 
operational. Since then, SIC
11 —a public real estate development agency—has built some small sewer 
systems as part of housing construction projects for civil servants. In theory the SIC systems serve 60,000 
people (or 0.6 percent of the urban population), but in practice many of the systems are no longer 
functioning. Some small-scale pilot projects have recently been initiated. The private sector has invested 
in approximately 70 sludge collectors in Douala and Yaoundé, and donors have financed small 
condominial systems in Douala, Bertoua, and Edea, and as part of the Community-Led Total Sanitation 
campaign in selected rural areas (World Bank 2011d). 
 
                                                 










































































Figure 18. Urban versus rural access to water supply and sanitation, 2006 
a. Water supply  b. Sanitation  
   
Source: AICD water supply and sanitation utilities database downloadable from http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data. 
Access figures calculated by AICD using data the 2006 Multiple Indicators Cluster Surveys published by WHO 2010a and 2010b 
 
The effects of low investment in the water supply and sanitation sectors are compounded by low 
budget-execution ratios. The discrepancy between the budget cycle and the cycle of projects makes it hard 
for the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources to spend up to 50 percent of its investment budget each 
year. As of 2010 a trust fund set up to finance sustainable development projects in the water and 
sanitation sector was not operating (Global Water Partnership 2010).  
Power 
Achievements 
Access to power has steadily improved in Cameroon. National access to electricity increased from 37 
percent in 1996 to 46 percent in 2002, and to 48 percent in 2007 (Helio International 2009; World Bank 
and IFC 2010), above the average for Africa’s resource-rich countries (table 10). Estimates of urban 
access suggest that between 65 percent and 88 percent of the urban population has access to electricity 
(USAID 2010; Nkama 2007). At 88 percent, access to power in urban areas is greater than in most low-, 
middle-, and resource-rich countries in Africa. But these positive trends do not extend to rural areas: only 
about 14 percent of rural dwellers benefit from access to electricity, half the level incomparable countries. 
Several regulatory measures have been adopted to attract private sector participation in the power 
sector. In 1998, the government initiated a series of reforms to develop the sector. In 2000 a sector 
regulator (ARSEL) and a rural electrification agency were established. The reforms provided for private 
sector participation in transmission, generation, and distribution. In 2001, the state-owned, vertically 
integrated utility was privatized, becoming AES Sonel, and granted a monopoly over transmission and 
distribution in the concession area, as well as the right to own up to 1,000 MW of installed generation 
capacity. In 2006 the Electricity Development Corporation (EDC) was established as an asset holder; 
EDC currently supports the preparations for the Lom Pangar Hydropower project. In 2009 a rural energy 





























































The privatization of AES Sonel has led to growing power connections, reductions in unserved energy 
demand, and increasing investment, particularly in generation infrastructure. Since 2001 AES Sonel has 
connected some 160,000 customers and invested more than $300 million in generation capacity and 
rehabilitation of the network. Unserved energy decreased from 2 percent in 2003 to 0.5 percent in 2008. 
Privatization has also leveraged $360 million in private funds for a five-year investment program focused 
on rehabilitation of existing hydropower stations and transmission networks. Also, since privatization, the 
generation capacity of AES Sonel has been expanded. AES Sonel built two new plants powered by heavy 
fuel oil: Dibamba, an 88 MW emergency power plant near Douala, and Limbe with 85 MW. In addition, 
in 2006 AES Sonel collected about 94 percent of its bills, above the average for resource-rich countries 
(at 70 percent, table 10).  
The investments in generation infrastructure have put Cameroon’s per capita generation capacity 
above the level of peer countries. The recent additions to generation assets, in the form of the thermal 
power plants at Limbe and Dibamba, have helped boost per capita capacity. Cameroon has 58 MW of 
installed capacity per million people, compared with just 43 MW per million for the resource rich 
countries as a whole.  
Table 10. Cameroon’s power indicators benchmarked 




National access to electricity  % of population  48  50  46 
Urban access to electricity  % of population  88  85  79 
Rural access to electricity  % of population  14  33  28 
Installed generation capacity  MW  1,105  36,971  4,105 
Installed generation capacity per million  MW per million people  58  799  43 
Firms that find power a constraint for business   % firms  67*  31  56 
Firms with own generator   % firms  51  18  63 
Outages, number, annually  number per year  128  71  174 
Outages, value lost, annually   % sales  5  2  7 
Collection rate, reported by utility  % billing  94  91  70 
Cost recovery ratio, historical  %  60  85  97 
Revenue per unit  US cents per kWh  12  13  13 
System losses  % generation  35  20  52 
Total hidden costs  % revenue  135  0  168 







Residential tariff (at 75 kWh)  US cents per KWh  0.10  10.27 
5–10  Commercial tariff at 900 kWh  US cents per KWh    11.73 
Industrial tariff (at 50,000 kWh)  US cents per KWh  0.03  11.39 
Source: Eberhard and others 2009. 
Note: Cameroon data are for 2005 unless indicated otherwise. Constraint to business activity based on the manufacturing sector. Industrial 
tariffs represent prices paid for ALUCAM, the large aluminum smelter. 




Further investment will help Cameroon diversify its energy portfolio and enhance the availability of 
reliable power in the country. At present, 70 to 80 percent of Cameroon’s power is derived from 
hydropower sources, with the remainder from conventional thermal. Cameroon’s first independent power 
producing agreement (IPP) will add 216 MW in power generation and trigger the development of 
Cameroon’s gas reserves, as yet unexploited. Also, Cameroon will further increase its generation capacity 
when the new Lom Pangar plant becomes fully operational.  
Challenges 
In spite of recent increases in generation capacity, power generation continues to be expensive in 
Cameroon. At $0.17 per kilowatt-hour, power costs in Cameroon, are among the highest in Africa, 
inviting comparison with costs from small-scale thermal systems (figure 19). Two factors explain the high 
costs. First, hydropower resources are seasonal and subject to fluctuation. Second, prices are high for the 
diesel on which the country relies for back-up generation in the dry season (figure 20). Despite 
Cameroon’s oil resources, the country lacks a refinery, and prices reflect that lack. The costs of 
transporting oil along Central Africa’s corridors are high ($0.13 per tonne-kilometer).  
Figure 19.Costs of power production in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: Briceño-Garmendia and Shkaratan 2010. 
 
The average power tariff in Cameroon, at $0.10 per kilowatt-hour, fails to recover production costs. 
Whereas tariffs are in the middle of the price distribution in Sub-Saharan Africa (figure 21), they mask 
generous cross-subsidies to the aluminum smelter, Alucam. The low- and medium-voltage consumer paid 
between $0.11 and $0.14 cents in 2009, whereas Alucam benefitted from a tariff cap of 7 CFA francs per 
kilowatt-hour (less than $0.02) up to 2009, until recent revisions took effect (Husband, McMahon, and 
van der Veen 2009) (box 2). 































































































































































































































Figure 20. Diesel and super gasoline retail prices 
a. Prices of diesel and super gasoline in Cameroon  b. Retail price of diesel in Central Africa 
 
 
Source: GTZ 2009. Diesel retail prices as of mid-November 2008 from GTZ Survey carried out November 15–17, 2008. 
 
Figure 21. Power prices in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 





















































































































































































































































































































Box 2. Electricity subsidies for aluminum in Cameroon 
Alucam is Cameroon’s largest electricity consumer accounting for 35–40 percent of the power produced. Under 
a historic 30-year agreement that ended in 2009, Alucam benefitted from extraordinarily low prices for 
electricity and a guaranteed supply of power. Alucam was guaranteed 145 MW of power during the dry season 
and 165 MW during the rainy season. A tariff cap of 7 CFA francs per kWh (around $0.017) until the end of 
2009, compared to tariffs of $0.114/kWh and $0.136/kWh for medium- and low-voltage customers, 
respectively. These prices were exceedingly low in the context of chronic power problems throughout the 
country. Alucam has been seen as receiving an implicit power subsidy for decades. The overall subsidies can be 
estimated to be around $120 million per year, equivalent to 32 percent of AES Sonel’s revenue. Since the 
expiration of the agreement, power prices have been increased by 73 percent to 12.94 CFA francs, or $0.031 per 
kWh. These prices are above the global electricity tariffs for aluminum companies, which average around US 
cents 2.56 per kWh.  Even with the price increase, they still fall well below the operating costs of power 
generation at US cents 13 per kWh and the total cost of US cents 17 per kWh, adding to the cost recovery woes 
of AES Sonel. 
Source: Husband, McMahon, and van der Veen 2009, World Bank, 2011b. 
 
High costs and subsidized tariffs, compounded by weak operational performance, affect the financial 
sustainability of AES Sonel. Tariffs have historically recovered only 60 percent of the costs, significantly 
below cost-recovery levels in Africa’s middle-and resource-rich countries (table 10). AES Sonel loses 
approximately $0.07 per kilowatt-hour sold. Due to the prevalence of theft, transmission and distribution 
losses have historically been high, at 35 percent, above the level observed incomparable countries. In fact, 
nontechnical losses increased from 22 percent in 2006 to 26 percent in 2008. Burgeoning illegal 
connections, decrepit metering systems, and outmoded billing software have compounded the situation.  
The burden of financial and operational inefficiencies has increased over time. Hidden costs rose 
from about 108 percent of revenues in 2005 to 121 percent in 2009. In 2009, system losses drained $167 
million from AES Sonel’s revenues. In absolute terms, the largest contributor to the hidden costs was the 
mispricing of power, which resulted in losses of $265 million in 2009 (table 11). Relative to several of 
Cameroon’s West and Central African neighbors, the burden of hidden costs for AES Sonel is high 
(figure 22b). 




















GWh/year  %  %  $/kWh  $/kWh  $/kWh  $mill/year  % revenues 
2005  3,264  31  93.7  0.17  0.11  0.10  384  108 
2006  3,374  28  93.7  0.17  0.09  0.08  435  151 
2007  3,360  32  93.7  0.17  0.10  0.09  426  128 
2008  3,512  33  93.7  0.17  0.11  0.10  409  105 
2009  3,522  35  93.7  0.17  0.11  0.10  454  121 
Source: Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster 2009; World Bank 2008 and 2011b 
 




Figure 22. Hidden costs in power generation in Cameroon and comparator countries 
a. AES Sonel  b. Selected power utilities in Central and West Africa 
   
Source: Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster 2009. 
 
The power supply in Cameroon is unreliable. Investment climate surveys suggest that firms 
encountered around 128 outages in 2009, almost as twice the average for Africa’s middle-income 
countries, enduring blackouts of four hours each time. On average, at least 16 days a year are spent 
without power due to outages (World Bank 2009c). To combat erratic power supply, many firms generate 
their own power. It is estimated that as much as 31 percent of the country’s installed capacity is self-
generation. Suppressed demand for power is around 241 GWh and is expected to progressively increase 
with growing domestic demand (World Bank and IFC 2010). 
Investment climate surveys from 2007 determined that unreliable power was one of the top five 
constraints to business activity. Around 67 percent of firms reported that power was a major constraint to 
business, similar to other fragile states but worse than the averages for Africa’s low- and middle-income 
countries and resource-rich countries.  
Firms that generate their own power face high costs. Self-generation is estimated to cost the private 
sector $0.46 per kilowatt-hour, four times the tariff charged by the power utility, which pushes up the 
prices of the firms’ products. If the price premium of running backup generators is included assuming that 
they run 10 percent of the time, firms pay a markup of around $0.04 per kilowatt-hour to power costs. 
Looking ahead, simulations 
suggest that with development of 
regional trade, made possible by 
further development of Cameroon’s 
hydropower resources, AES Sonel’s 
long-run marginal costs could fall to 
$0.07 per kilowatt-hour, less than half 
the current value, and would be better 
aligned with current tariffs levels 
(figure 23). The cost reductions would 
































































Collection Inefficiencies Underpricing Losses
Figure 23. Long-run prospects for power in Cameroon 
 
Source: Rosnes and Vennemo 2009; World Bank 2008 
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Cameroon’s hydropower resources. 
Cameroon has enormous potential within the Central African Power Pool (CAPP) to produce low-
cost hydropower and become a major player in regional trade by exporting power to Chad, the Republic 
of Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea. To fully develop regional trade through the CAPP, however, 
Cameroon would need to develop 1,400 MW of hydropower over and above the amounts needed to meet 
domestic demand, and to develop an additional 831 MW in interconnector capacity. This would also 
result in commercial gain through exporting over half the domestic power production. A one-time 
investment of $2.6 billion to develop additional hydropower potential and interconnectors in Cameroon 
would yield an annual return of 12 percent. 
Information and communication technologies 
Achievements 
Mobile communications have been the main driver of ICT access in Cameroon, as in most African 
countries. Cameroon was an early introducer of mobile competition through the licensing of two 
operators, but the market has remained a duopoly. Mobile subscriptions per 100 people rose from fewer 
than one in 2000 to 34 by 2009, with 85 percent of the population now covered by a signal (table 12) 
(France Telecom 2010). 
Table 12. Cameroon’s ICT indicators benchmarked 






Indicator  Unit  2000  2008/09  2008  2008 
GSM coverage    % population under signal  30  85  77  56 
Mobile phone   subscribers/100 people   0.6  34  47  33.3 
International bandwidth   bits/capita   0.2  13  153  34 
Internet   users/100 people   0.3  6  13.9  5.1 




countries  Sub-Saharan Africa 
2009  2008  2008 
Price of monthly mobile basket  US dollars  14.7  8.4  11.8 
Price of monthly fixed-line basket  US dollars  14.7  4.8  11.6 
Price of monthly fixed broadband   US dollars  104  31  100.1 
Price of a 1-minute call to US   US dollars  0.8  —  0.9 
Price of an inter-Africa call per minute  US dollars  0.9  —  1.0 
Source: AICD database. 
— = data not available 
 





As of 2008, Cameroon and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo were the 
top two leading markets for mobile 
telephony in Central Africa, with around 
4.5 million subscribers in each country, 
followed by Chad with 1.1 million 
subscribers and Gabon with 1 million 
(figure 24).Since 2006 fixed-line 
penetration has grown rapidly with the 
expansion of limited-mobility portable 
phones offered by the incumbent operator, 
CAMTEL.
12Such phones are a fixed-line 
solution that offers mobility of up to 40 
kilometers and both mobile and fixed handsets. In 2008, two years after the launch, users of this 
technology increased from 28,000 to 150,000, surpassing the number of traditional fixed lines in the 
country (125,000). The number of landline subscriptions per 100 people grew from 0.6 in 2000 to 2.2 in 
2009.  
Challenges  
Cameroon has lagged in reforming its 
telecommunication sector. Even though the 
sector regulator, ART (Agence de 
Régulation des Télécommunications), was 
established by the Telecommunications Act 
in 1998, no further legislation has been 
enacted and the regulatory landscape 
remains unclear. The market is still not 
fully liberalized. South Africa’s MTN and 
Orange of France dominate the mobile 
market, which is one of the highest in 
Cameroon’s peer group, as measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (figure 
25).
13There are numerous Internet service 
providers, but the market is led by CAMNET, a CAMTEL subsidiary offering ADLS connections, and 
the two mobile operators. 
                                                 
12 Cameroon Telecommunications. 
13 The Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is 
calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting 
numbers. An HHI of 100 indicates the market is a monopoly, while a lower the HHI the more diluted is the market 
power as exerted by one company/agent. 
Figure 24. Expansion of mobile and land-line markets in Cameroon 
 
Source:  Balancing Act 2008. 
Note: In 2008, there were 125,000 fixed lined and 150,000 fixed/mobile lines. 
Figure 25. Market concentration in Cameroon and selected 
African peers 
 









































































Restructuring and privatizing CAMTEL will yield significant fiscal benefits. CAMTEL has been the 
recipient of large indirect subsidies in infrastructure, highlighting the significant costs of the telecom 
sector to government. In most other African countries, the telecom sector is the first to be privatized and 
to operate without government support, as its sector fundamentals allow for cost recovery through 
commercial tariffs and a relatively short path to breaking even because of relatively low capital 
expenditures. The privatization of CAMTEL was launched in 1997, but the process stalled in 2002 after 
negotiations with the first two bidders failed.  
The country has yet to benefit fully from its connection to the SAT3 undersea fiber-optic cables. 
Connection to SAT3 led to an increase in Internet connectivity from 0.2 to 13 bits per person between 
2000 and 2009 (figure 26a), but that rate of connectivity is low in comparison to Sub-Saharan African 
peers (table 12, figure 26b).  
The full benefit of the submarine cable connection has been mitigated by CAMTEL’s monopoly over 
the gateway: Although prices are cheaper where there is access to submarine cable, they are even lower 
when there is a competitive international gateway. As a result, Internet service providers continue to rely 
on costly VSAT infrastructure. Although Cameroon’s Internet and international call prices are level with 
the Sub-Saharan Africa average (table 12), ample room remains for lower prices (table 13). As an 
example, the launch of competitive wireless offerings by mobile operators forced down fixed broadband 
prices from $104 in 2009 to $61 in 2010.  
 
Figure 26. The Internet market in Cameroon and elsewhere in Central Africa 
a. Cameroon  b. Selected Central African countries, 2008 
   
Source: AICD database. 
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Further competition would boost 
broadband development. As of 2009, there 
were only about 8,000 fixed broadband 
subscriptions in the Cameroon. Mobile 
operators have been slow to launch high-
speed mobile wireless networks and instead 
have deployed fixed wireless solutions using 
WiMAX technology. Two additional 
undersea cables now underway should 
bolster competition and lower wholesale 
prices, as they will provide direct 
international Internet connectivity for each of the mobile operators. The West Africa Cable System 
(WACS), of which MTN is a signatory, plans a launch in 2011.
14 The Africa Coast to Europe (ACE) 
cable, with Orange Cameroon as a shareholder, is scheduled for launch in 2012.
15 The national fiber-optic 
backbone, much of it built along the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, is being expanded with Chinese 
assistance.
16 
Financing Cameroon’s infrastructure 
To meet its most pressing infrastructure needs and catch up with developing countries in other parts 
of the world, Cameroon must expand its infrastructure assets in key areas (table 14). The targets outlined 
below are purely illustrative, but they represent a level of aspiration that is not unreasonable. Developed 
in a standardized way across African countries, they allow for cross-country comparisons of the 
affordability of meeting the targets, which can be modified or delayed as needed to achieve financial 
balance.  
Table 14. Illustrative investment targets for infrastructure in Cameroon 
  Economic target  Social target 
Transport  Achieve regional (national) connectivity with good-
quality 2-lane (or 1-lane) paved roads. 
Provide rural road access to 20 percent of the highest-value 
agricultural land, and urban road access within 500 meters 
Irrigation  Develop an additional 170,463 hectares of 
economically viable small-scale irrigation  n.a. 
WSS  n.a.  Achieve Millennium Development Goals and clear the 
rehabilitation backlog in the sector 
Power  Develop 2,471 MW of new generation capacity and 
831 MW of interconnectors (no-trade scenario).  
Raise electrification to 71 percent (84 percent in urban 
areas and 49 percent in rural areas)  
ICT  Install fiber-optic links to neighboring capitals and 
submarine cable  
Provide universal access to GSM signal and public 
broadband facilities  
Source: Mayer and others 2008; Rosnes and Vennemo 2009; Carruthers and others 2009; You and others 2009. 





Table 13. Africa’s ICT prices, 2008 
US$  Price per minute 
during peak time 
Monthly 
Internet 
ADSL[a]    Region  US 
Without submarine cable  0.97  0.96  266 
With submarine cable  1.07  0.63  89 
 -- Monopoly on international gateway  1.65  1.11  109 
 -- Competitive international gateway  0.45  0.28  65 
Source: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009. 
a. 256 kbps connection. 





Meeting these illustrative infrastructure 
targets for Cameroon would cost $1.5 
billion per year over a decade. Capital 
expenditure would account for 74 percent 
of this requirement. Power and water are 
the sectors with the greatest spending 
needs; each will require an estimated $0.4 
billion per year to meet the targets 
specified above. The transport sector will 
require about $0.3 billion each year to 
build and rehabilitate roads and other 
modes of transportation. Around $0.2 
billion per annum will be required to 
provide sufficient connectivity and modern 
voice and broadband technologies in the ICT sector. Irrigation will require another $0.09 billion annually 
(table 15).  
Cameroon’s infrastructure 
spending needs, while high in 
absolute terms, would absorb only 
8.9 percent of GDP, among the 
lowest shares in the region 
(figure 27). Investment would 
account for about 6.6 percent of 
GDP, around half of what China 
invested in its infrastructure during 
the mid-2000s.  
Cameroon already spends a 
sizable amount ($0.9 billion per 
year) to meet its infrastructure 
needs (table 16).About 47 percent 
of that total is allocated to capital 
expenditure and 53 percent to 
operating expenditures. Operating 
expenditure is entirely covered 
from budgetary resources and 
payments by infrastructure users. 
About 40 percent of capital expenditure funding comes from the federal and state governments and from 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Cameroon relies on private flows for about 35 percent of total capital 
spending on infrastructure in the ICT, power, and water sectors. Official development assistance (ODA) 
from the member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) plays 
accounts for about 21 percent of total capital spending, mostly for transport, water, and power. Non-
Table 15. Indicative infrastructure spending needs in Cameroon 
for 2006 to 2015 
$ million per year 
Sector  Capital 
expenditure  O&M  Total 
needs 
ICT  109  64  173 
Irrigation  88  3  91 
Power  (no-trade scenario)  381  73  454 
Transport   205  122  328 
Water supply and sanitation  311  123  434 
Total  1,095  385  1,480 
Source:  Mayer and others 2008; Rosnes and Vennemo 2009; Carruthers and 
others 2009; You and others 2009.  
Note: O&M= operations and maintenance. 
Figure 27. Cameroon’s infrastructure spending needs in the regional 
context 
As percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009. 
Note: LIC = low-income countries; MIC = middle-income countries; ECOWAS = Economic 
Community of West African States; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; GDP = gross domestic 
product; O&M = operations and maintenance; CAPEX = capital expenditure. 
 





















OECD financiers account for around 4 percent of capital spending. Their presence is most pronounced in 
the transport sector.  
Table 16. Financial flows to Cameroon’s infrastructure, 2001-2006 
$ millions per year 
 
O&M  Capital expenditure 
Total 
spending  Public sector 
Public 
sector  ODA 
Non-OECD 
financiers  PPI 
Total 
CAPEX 
ICT  90  100  3  0  76  179  270 
Irrigation  3  0  0  0  0  0  3 
Power   173  8  15  2  60  84  258 
Transport   175  32  53  13  0  98  273 
WSS  48  36  23  1  19  79  127 
Total  490  176  93  16  156  440  930 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: Financial flows are annual averages between 2001 and 2006. O&M = operations and maintenance; ODA = official development 
assistance; PPI = private participation in infrastructure; CAPEX = capital expenditure; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development; WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology. 
 
Cameroon’s current spending 
on infrastructure amounts to 
around 5.6 percent of GDP 
(figure 28), slightly less than the 
average spending in other 
resource-rich countries. Relative 
to this peer group, Cameroon is 
more heavily reliant on public 
spending in the ICT sector, but 
less reliant on public spending in 
the other infrastructure sectors. In 
comparison to peers, ODA plays a 
much more pronounced role in 
transport, while the power sector 
receives more private investment 
(figure 29). ICT, power, and 
transport in Cameroon each 
receive 28–29 percent of total 
infrastructure spending, and the 
water sector receives the remaining 14 percent. 
   
Figure 28. Cameroon’s infrastructure spending in regional context, 2001–06 
As percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: Financial flows are annual averages between 2001 and 2006. LIC = low-income 
country; MIC = middle-income country; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African 
States; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; GDP = gross domestic product; O&M= operations and 
maintenance; CAPEX = capital expenditure. 




















Figure 29. Patterns of capital investment in infrastructure, benchmarked against comparator countries 
Investment in infrastructure sectors as percentage of GDP, by source 
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).  
Note: Private investment includes self-financing by households. Non-OECD financiers include China, India, and the Arab countries. 
ODA = official development assistance; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; ICT = information and 
communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product; WSS = water supply and sanitation; LIC = low-income countries. 
How much more can be done within the existing resource envelope? 
Approximately $586 million in additional resources could be recovered each year by improving 
efficiency (table 17). The largest potential source of efficiency gains is improving cost. Raising tariffs to 
cost-recovery levels could generate annual savings of $266 million in the power sector and $22 million in 
the water sector annually. Also, reducing operational and financial inefficiencies (distributional losses and 
undercollection of bills) in the power and water sectors could generate annual savings of around $254 
million. Looking across sectors, power-related efficiencies offer the greatest potential for savings—up to 
$487 million per year (table 17). 
Table 17. Cameroon’s potential gains from greater operational efficiency 
$ million 
  ICT  Irrigation  Power  Transport  WSS  Total 
Underpricing  -  n.a.  266  0  22  288 
Overstaffing  n.a.  —  30  —  n.a.  30 
Distributional losses  —  —  168  —  14  181 
Undercollection  —  n.a.  21  33  19  73 
Low budget execution  0  0  3  9  2  15 
Total  0  0  487  43  57  586 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology. 
— = Not available; n.a. = Not applicable. 
Raising tariffs to cost-recovery 
Setting tariff at a cost-recovery level in the power and water sector could generate the highest savings 
in Cameroon. About $288 million could be saved if underpricing of power and water services is tackled 
(table 17). The high subsidies in the power and water prices are highly inequitable as the richest are the 





























Although power underpricing costs 
Cameroon about $266 million each 
year, or 1.2 percent of the country’s 
GDP, Cameroon’s power utility is 
actually doing better than the average 
for other resource-rich countries, where 
underpricing of power is commonplace 
(figure 30). It is estimated that the 
average historical cost of producing 
electricity is $0.17 per kilowatt-hour in 
Cameroon, while the average effective 
tariff, as of 2009, was $0.10.  
Average tariffs charged by CDE, 
the water utility, stood at $0.70 per 
cubic meter in 2009, far less than the estimated average cost-recovery tariff of $0.97 per cubic meter.  The 
macroeconomic burden of undercharging for water services is 0.1 percent of GDP, significantly lower 
than the burden imposed by undercharging for power, but still slightly higher than that in other resource-
rich countries. 
Because of inequitable access to power and 
water services in Cameroon, subsidized tariffs are 
regressive. The majority of households that have 
electricity belong to the top quintiles of the 
income distribution—indeed; household 
connections to the electricity grid are nonexistent 
for poorer households (figure 31). This 
inequitable distribution virtually guarantees that 
any price subsidy for power will be regressive, as 
is common in Africa for both power and water 
(figure 32). 
How expensive would utility bills become if 
cost-reflective tariffs were applied? With a cost-
recovery tariff of $0.17 per kilowatt-hour and a 
monthly subsistence consumption of 50 kilowatt-
hours, the associated utility bill would come to 
$8.50 per month. Based on the distribution of 
household budgets in Cameroon, monthly utility bills at these levels would be affordable to everyone 
(figure 33). A bill for subsistence consumption of 10 cubic meters of water would come to $10 per month. 
The combined bill for electricity and water at these levels would be affordable to close to 80 percent of 
the population. A more limited level of subsistence consumption of 25 kilowatt-hours per month for 
power and 4 cubic meters per month for water—enough to meet the most basic needs—would cost $4 per 
month each and would be affordable to 100 percent of the population. 
Figure 30. Underpricing of power and water in Cameroon 
Financial burden of underpricing, as percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).  
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; LIC = low-income country. 
Figure 31. Household consumption of electricity in 
Cameroon is highly differentiated by income 
Prevalence of connection to power grid among population, by income 
quintile 
 
Source: Banerjee and others 2009. 























































Figure 32. Electricity and water subsidies that reach the poor 
a. Electricity  b. Water 
   
Source: Banerjee and others 2008a. 
Note: Omega is a measure of distributional incidence, or the share of subsidies received by the poor as a percentage of their share in the 
population. The higher the value of omega, the better the distributional performance of the subsidy. Values of omega below 1 denote a 
regressive subsidy and values above 1 denote a progressive subsidy. 
CAR = Central African Republic; DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
Figure 33. Affordability of electricity and water in Cameroon and in other low-income countries 
 
Source: Banerjee and others 2009. 
Note: LIC = low-income countries; kWh = kilowatt-hour. 
 






























































































































































Monthly utility bill (US$)
Cameroon
LIC
Average cost of power is 4 $/month per 25 kwh or 8 USD/Month per 50 kwh subsistence consumption
Average cost of water is 3.28 $/month per 4 m3 or 8.2 USD/Month per 10 m3 subsistence consumption
Power cost-recovery tariff is 0.16 $/kwh




Reducing operational and financial inefficiencies 
Reducing operational and financial inefficiencies could save Cameroon around $254 million per year 
(table 17), in particular by means of reducing distributional losses.  
Reducing distributional loses in the power and water system could also contribute to expand the 
resource envelop. Around $181 million could be saved if AES Sonel and CDE reduce the amount of 
power and water lost in their networks (table 17). Distributional losses of power cost the utility, AES 
SONEL, $168 million per year (or 0.8 percent of GDP, figure 34a). The utility’s 2009 losses of 35 
percent are more than three times the best-practice benchmark of 10 percent. By reducing CDE’s 
distributional losses of water from 34 percent (the level in 2009), to the 20 percent benchmark of a well-
functioning utility, Cameroon could avoid economic losses of $14 million (or 0.06 percent of GDP, figure 
34b).  
Undercollection of bills costs Cameroon around $73 million per year. In the power sector, $21 million 
per year (or 0.09 percent of GDP, figure 34a) could be saved by raising bill collection efficiency from 94 
to 100 percent. In the water sector, improving bill collection ratio from 66 to 100 percent would save 
another $19 million annually (or 0.08 percent of GDP, figure 34b). 
Figure 34. Macroeconomic burden of operational inefficiencies of Cameroon’s power and water utilities 
Uncollected bills and unaccounted losses as percentage of GDP 
a. Power sector  b. Water sector 
   
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). 
Annual funding gap 
Cameroon’s infrastructure funding gap amounts to $350 million per year, or about 2 percent of GDP, 
once efficiencies are captured. The bulk of the gap can be traced to the water, irrigation, and transport 
sectors (table 18). No funding gap is found in the ICT sector or, once large potential efficiency gains are 
captured, in the power sector. 
























































Table 18. Funding gaps by sector 
$ millions 
 
ICT  Irrigation  Power  Transport  WSS  Total 
Spending needs  (173)  (91)  (454)  (328)  (434)  (1,480) 
Existing spending  173   3   157   220   127   681  
Reallocation potential within sectors  0   0   100   53   0   153  
Efficiency gains  0   0   487   43   57   586  
Funding gap  0   (88)  0   (12)  (250)  (350) 
Reallocation potential across sectors  96   0   0   0   0   96  
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: Reported totals assume complete fungibility across sectors. Potential overspending across sectors is not included in the calculation 
of the funding gap, because it cannot be assumed that savings from elimination of overspending would be applied in other infrastructure 
sectors.  
WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology. 
What else can be done? 
The funding gap can be addressed only by raising additional finance or, alternatively, by adopting 
lower-cost technologies or less-ambitious targets for infrastructure development.  
In the case of Cameroon, there may be realistic prospects for increasing the flow of resources to all 
infrastructure sectors form private players and public sources. 
Cameroon has already attracted a significant amount of private finance into infrastructure. In the early 
2000s, Cameroon captured private investment commitments worth about 1 percent of its GDP, not only in 
the ICT sector but also in power. Many other African countries have done far worse in this area (figure 
35). On the other hand, some—for example Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, and Senegal—have done much 
better, attracting more that 2 percent of GDP in private finance for infrastructure. 
Figure 35. Private sector participation 
Average per year between 2002 and 2007 
 
Source: AICD calculations. 








































































































































































































































































































































































Adopting lower-cost technologies could substantially reduce the cost of meeting the posited 
infrastructure targets and thereby reduce the funding gap. Meeting the Millennium Development Goals 
for water supply and sanitation with technologies (such as stand posts, boreholes, and improved latrines) 
that cost less than those previously used could reduce the associated price tag from $434 million to $362 
million each year. Similarly, meeting transport connectivity standards using lower-cost road surfaces(such 
as single surface treatments) could reduce the associated price tag from $328 million to $196 million. The 
overall savings from these measures would amount to $205 million, which would reduce the funding gap 
by 58 percent, underscoring the importance of technology choices (table 19). 
Table 19. Savings from innovation 
$ millions 




after innovation  Savings 
Savings as % 
of sector 
funding gap 
Savings as % 
of total funding 
gap 
Water supply and sanitation, low-cost technology  434  362  73  29  21 
Roads, single surface treatment  328  196  132  1,092  38 
Total  762  558  205  342  58 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
Finally, if all else fails, it may be necessary to extend the time horizon for meeting the infrastructure 
targets beyond the illustrative 10-year period considered here. Simulations suggest that even if Cameroon 
is unable to raise additional finance—but is able to eliminate inefficiencies—the identified infrastructure 
targets could be achieved over a 13-year horizon. However, without stemming inefficiencies, the existing 
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investments and designing policy reforms in Africa’s infrastructure sectors.  
The AICD is based on an unprecedented effort to collect detailed economic and technical data on African 
infrastructure. The project has produced a series of original reports on public expenditure, spending 
needs, and sector performance in each of the main infrastructure sectors, including energy, information 
and communication technologies, irrigation, transport, and water and sanitation. Africa’s Infrastructure—
A Time for Transformation, published by the World Bank and the Agence Française de Développement in 
November 2009, synthesized the most significant findings of those reports.  
The focus of the AICD country reports is on benchmarking sector performance and quantifying the main 
financing and efficiency gaps at the country level. These reports are particularly relevant to national 
policy makers and development partners working on specific countries. 
The AICD was commissioned by the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa following the 2005 G8 (Group 
of Eight) summit at Gleneagles, Scotland, which flagged the importance of scaling up donor finance for 
infrastructure in support of Africa’s development.  
The AICD’s first phase focused on 24 countries that together account for 85 percent of the gross domestic 
product, population, and infrastructure aid flows of Sub-Saharan Africa. The countries are: Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Under a second phase of the project, coverage was 
expanded to include as many of the remaining African countries as possible.  
Consistent with the genesis of the project, the main focus is on the 48 countries south of the Sahara that 
face the most severe infrastructure challenges. Some components of the study also cover North African 
countries so as to provide a broader point of reference. Unless otherwise stated, therefore, the term 
―Africa‖ is used throughout this report as a shorthand for ―Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ 
    
 
The World Bank has implemented the AICD with the guidance of a steering committee that represents the 
African Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Africa’s regional economic 
communities, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA), and major infrastructure donors.  
Financing for the AICD is provided by a multidonor trust fund to which the main contributors are the 
United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), the Public Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility (PPIAF), Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the European Commission, and 
Germany’s Entwicklungsbank (KfW). A group of distinguished peer reviewers from policy-making and 
academic circles in Africa and beyond reviewed all of the major outputs of the study to ensure the 
technical quality of the work. The Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program and the Water and 
Sanitation Program provided technical support on data collection and analysis pertaining to their 
respective sectors. 
The data underlying the AICD’s reports, as well as the reports themselves, are available to the public 
through an interactive Web site, www.infrastructureafrica.org, that allows users to download customized 
data reports and perform various simulations. Many AICD outputs will appear in the World Bank’s 
Policy Research Working Papers series. 
Inquiries concerning the availability of data sets should be directed to the volume editors at the World 
Bank in Washington, DC. 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 